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  <title>How Do People Respond to Reputation: Ostracize, Price Discriminate or Punish?</title>
  <link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/scl/papers/reputationExpt/reputation-expts-and-Prosper.pdf</link>
  <minidescription>How people use reputation information.</minidescription>
  <tags>
	  <tag>reputation</tag>
	  <tag>incentive design</tag>
	  <tag>experimental economics</tag>
  </tags> 
  <description>We evaluated how people use reputation in a laboratory market and in
Prosper, an online microfinance business. We found people use
information on past behavior to ostracize previous poor performance
in both cases. The laboratory market did not show significant price
discrimination, but people used their ability to not fulfill
contracts to punish poor performers. Price discrimination was
significantly correlated with reputation in Prosper. Thus we find
people apply multiple strategies to deal with reputation.
	</description>
	<author>Kay-Yut Chen, Scott Golder, Tad Hogg and Cecilia Zenteno</author>
  <pubDate>2008-08-19 12:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
  <title>Experiments with Probabilistic Quantum Auctions</title>
  <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0707.4195</link>
  <minidescription>How people perform in an auction using simulated quantum information processing.</minidescription>
  <tags>
	  <tag>quantum information</tag>
	  <tag>incentive design</tag>
	  <tag>experimental economics</tag>
  </tags> 
  <description>We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. 
Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities.	</description>
	<author>Kay-Yut Chen and Tad Hogg</author>
  <pubDate>2008-08-19 12:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>How Well Do People Play a Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma?</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/qpdilemma/index.html</link>
	<minidescription>People can effectively use quantum entanglement to reduce free riding.</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>quantum information</tag>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
	  <tag>experimental economics</tag>
        </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Kay-Yut Chen and Tad Hogg</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>Experimental Study of Reputation Mechanisms in an Exchange Economy</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/reputationExpt/index.html</link>
	<minidescription>Revealing past behavior improves market efficiency</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>reputation</tag>
	  <tag>experimental economics</tag>
        </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Kay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg and Nathan Wozny</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>
</root>