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<item>
  <title>Quantum Auctions</title>
  <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0800</link>
  <minidescription>A privacy-preserving auction using quantum information processing.</minidescription>
  <tags>
	  <tag>quantum information</tag>
	  <tag>incentive design</tag>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
	  <tag>economics</tag>
  </tags> 
  <description>We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entanglement is not observable by others. The protocol is useful for information hiding applications, such as partnership bidding with allocative externality or concerns about revealing bidding preferences. The protocol applies to a variety of auction types, e.g., first or second price, and to auctions involving either a single item or arbitrary bundles of items (i.e., combinatorial auctions). We analyze the game-theoretical behavior of the quantum protocol for the simple case of a sealed-bid quantum, and show how a suitably designed adiabatic sear h reduces the possibilities for bidders to game the auction. This design illustrates how incentive rather that computational constraints affect quantum algorithm choices.
	</description>
	<author>Tad Hogg, Pavithra Harsha and Kay-Yut Chen</author>
  <pubDate>2008-08-19 12:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>How Well Do People Play a Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma?</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/qpdilemma/index.html</link>
	<minidescription>People can effectively use quantum entanglement to reduce free riding.</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>quantum information</tag>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
	  <tag>experimental economics</tag>
        </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Kay-Yut Chen and Tad Hogg</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>A Price-anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/tycoon/tycoon-ec.pdf</link>
	<minidescription>How efficient and fair is Tycoon?</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
        </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, and Li Zhang</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>The Efficiency and Fairness of a Fixed Budget Resource Allocation Game</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/tycoon/tycoon-icalp.pdf</link>
	<minidescription>Can we prove something about Tycoon?</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
        </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Li Zhang</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>A Quantum Treatment of Public Goods Economics</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/publicgoods/index.html</link>
	<minidescription>Quantum information can help address public goods problems.</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>quantum information</tag>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
	  <tag>economics</tag>
        </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Kay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg and Raymond Beausoleil</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/coordination/index.html</link>
	<minidescription>Entangled particles provide a coordination mechanism.</minidescription>
	<tags>
	  <tag>quantum information</tag>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
        </tags>
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Bernardo A. Huberman and Tad Hogg</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>

<item>
	<title>Avoiding Moral Hazards in Organizational Forecasting</title>
	<link>http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/moral/index.html</link>
	<minidescription>How to avoid killing the messenger while making him work hard.</minidescription>
  <tags>
	  <tag>game theory</tag>
  </tags> 
	<description>(click link to view abstract)</description>
	<author>Tad Hogg  and Bernardo A. Huberman</author>
	<pubDate>2007-01-01 00:00:00</pubDate>
</item>
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