http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Thomas_Sandholm/sandholm2008a.pdf Tradeoffs between using spot and reservation markets. tycoon incentive design resource allocation markets We propose, implement and evaluate three admission models for computational Grids. The models take the expected demand into account and offer a specific performance guarantee. The main issue addressed is how users and providers should make the tradeoff between a best effort (low guarantee) spot market and an admission controlled (high guarantee) reservation market. Using a realistically modeled high performance computing workload and utility models of user preferences, we run experiments highlighting the conditions under which different markets and admission models are efficient. The experimental results show that providers can make large efficiency gains if the admission model is chosen dynamically based on the current load, likewise we show that users have an opportunity to optimize their job performance by carefully picking the right market based on the state of t e system, and the characteristics of the application to be run. Finally, we provide simple functional expressions that can guide both users and providers when making decisions about guarantee levels to request or offer. Thomas Sandholm, Kevin Lai, and Scott Clearwater 2008-06-06 12:00:00 http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/ i_Zhang/papers/p2m-c.pdf Simple dynamics may lead to sophisticated equilibrium markets One of the main reasons of the recent success of peer to peer (P2P) file sharing systems such as BitTorrent is its built-in tit-for-tat mechanism. In this paper, we model the bandwidth allocation in a P2P system as an exchange economy and study a tit-for-tat dynamics, namely the proportional response dynamics, in this economy. In a proportional response dynamics each player distributes its good to its neighbors proportional to the utility it received from them in the last period. We show that this dynamics not only converges but converges to a market equilibrium, a standard economic characterization of efficient exchanges in a competitive market. In addition, for some classes of utility functions we consider, it converges much faster than the classical tatonnement process and any existing algorithms for computing market equilibria. Fang Wu and Li Zhang 2007-03-02 http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/keywordAuction/index.html How to bid in a continuous-time auction? markets This paper models continuous-time mass bidding markets, such as keyword auctions and market-based resource allocation systems, as a stochastic dynamic system that fluctuates around an average value under the influence of its users. The user's objective to maximize his long-term average utility is formulated as a stochastic control problem. The optimal bidding strategy is calculated both analytically and numerically. It is shown that market fluctuations tend to decrease expected system revenue, thus search engines like Google and Yahoo has an incentive to create a secondary stable market such as a futures market or a reservation market. Fang Wu 2007-02-15 10:00:00