Founding Mistrustful Quantum Cryptography on Coin Tossing?

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I. INTRODUCTION

Quantum computers pose a threat to most, if not all, standard classical cryptographic schemes. Typically, classical cryptosystems rely on the difficulty of factorisation or equivalent tasks, which we know quantum computers can solve efficiently. Even classical protocols which rely on problems for which no efficient quantum algorithm is currently known are somewhat suspect at the moment, since the power of quantum computers is not well understood.

Fortunately, for key distribution and a few other interesting cryptographic tasks, quantum cryptography offers a complete defence to the threat posed by quantum computers — unconditionally secure quantum protocols, which are provably unbreakable by classical or quantum computers. Unfortunately, this is not true of a wide range of important cryptographic tasks that allow mistrustful parties to generate, process or exchange information with suitable security guarantees. No-go theorems show the impossibility of unconditionally secure non-relativistic quantum protocols for many of these tasks — for example, bit commitment [1–5], oblivious transfer and some secure two-party computations [6]. In the last two cases, these theorems apply also to protocols which take account of relativistic signalling constraints.

Given that unconditional security is unattainable for these tasks, we have to fall back on weaker notions of security. One possible approach is to assume that that reliable bounds can be placed on the size of any quantum computer in the possession of an adversary, and to devise protocols which cannot be broken by quantum computers capable of manipulating no more than $N$ qubits coherently [7]. However, it is hard to tell at the moment whether future technological developments will allow for any such bounds. It is also known that bit commitment protocols can be devised which are secure under the assumption that quantum one-way functions exist. [8] However, identifying good candidate quantum one-way functions is itself a challenge.

It would, at any rate, certainly be good to be able to return to the “pre-quantum” state of affairs, replacing protocols which offer computational security against classical computers with protocols which offer credible computational security against quantum computers. For example, since NP-complete problems are generally thought unlikely to be solvable by quantum computers in polynomial time one might hope to build protocols whose security relies on the difficulty of solving a particular instance of a problem whose general case is NP-complete.

But there is an obvious difficulty here. Mistrustful cryptographic problems require security against both parties. But if $A$ proposes using a particular instance of a problem, $B$ has no way of verifying for sure that the particular problem proposed genuinely is hard. It is presumably in $A$’s interests to choose, if she can, an apparently hard problem with hidden structure, which is itself very hard to find, but which allows $A$ to solve the problem easily.

In this letter, I propose and briefly discuss a method which offers a possible way round this obstacle: using remote coin tossing — which we know can be implemented with perfect security by using relativistic signalling constraints, and with good computational security without making use of relativity — to allow mistrustful parties to generate random instances of hard problems.

I focus on one particularly important protocol — classically certified bit commitment. In a classically certified bit commitment protocol, $B$ is guaranteed that $A$ is committed to some fixed classical bit value, 0 or 1: the possibility that $A$’s bit commitment is described, until unveling, by a quantum mixture of 0 and 1 can be ex-
II. REMOTE COIN TOSSING

The aim of a remote coin tossing protocol [12] is to allow two mistrustful parties, A and B, to generate a random bit, in such a way that each has confidence that, so long as they behave honestly (whether or not the other party did), the resulting bit $b$ is genuinely random. More precisely, the protocol should guarantee the following. First, if both parties are honest, then \[ \text{Prob}(b = 0) = \text{Prob}(b = 1) = 1/2. \] Second, if one party is honest, then, whatever strategy the dishonest party uses, \[ \text{Prob}(b = 0) < 1/2 + \epsilon \text{ and } \text{Prob}(b = 1) < 1/2 + \epsilon. \] An ideal coin-tossing protocol guarantees this with $\epsilon = 0$. A secure coin-tossing protocol need not be ideal, so long as it contains parameters which can be chosen so as to make $\epsilon$ as small as desired.

Coin tossing is known to be strictly weaker than bit commitment, in non-relativistic classical and quantum cryptography. For any secure bit commitment protocol can be used for secure coin tossing: A commits a random bit $a$ to B; B returns a random bit $b$; A then unveils $a$ and they take $a \oplus b$ as the coin toss outcome. On the other hand, it is impossible to build a secure non-relativistic classical or quantum bit commitment protocol using a black box for secure ideal coin tossing. [13]

A simple unconditionally secure ideal coin tossing protocol can be defined by using relativistic signalling constraints. Fix some inertial coordinates, agreed by $A$ and $B$. Suppose $A$ controls sites $A_1$ and $A_2$, and $B$ controls sites $B_1$ and $B_2$, such that $A_1$ and $B_1$ are within distance $\delta$ of some agreed point $P_1$ and $A_2$ and $B_2$ are within distance $\delta$ of some agreed point $P_2$, where $P_1$ and $P_2$ are separated by $d \gg \delta$. Fix also some time $t$ agreed by $A$ and $B$. At time $t$, $A_1$ sends a random bit $a$ as a classical signal, to be received by $B_1$; at the same time, $B_2$ sends a random bit $b$ as a classical signal, to be received by $A_2$. $A$ and $B$ accept these signals as valid implementations of the protocol provided they are received (by $B_1$ and $A_2$ respectively), by time $t + 2\delta$. They then take $a \oplus b$ as the coin toss outcome. Each party is guaranteed that the outcome is randomly generated, so long as they receive the other party’s bit at a point outside the future light cone of the point from which their own was transmitted, and regardless of whether the other party’s chosen bit was genuinely random.

Relativistic coin tossing at a high bit rate is eminently practical, but will not work if the parties are unable or unwilling to arrange to control suitably adjacent separated sites. Strangers communicating by phone or over the internet, for instance, are likely to need a non-relativistic protocol if they urgently need to generate random bits. Unfortunately, no unconditionally secure non-relativistic classical coin tossing protocol exists. It is not known whether unconditionally secure non-relativistic quantum coin tossing protocols exist, though it is known that unconditionally secure ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible. [5] More recently, it has been shown that many such protocols have to involve $\Omega(\log \log \epsilon^{-1})$ rounds of communication to achieve bias $\epsilon$. [14]

Another approach to secure coin tossing is to build a coin tossing protocol from a bit commitment protocol which $A$ and $B$ trust to be temporarily computationally secure. They can then use these temporarily secure bit commitments to implement computationally secure coin tossings, using the construction described above — so long as the bit commitment is trusted to be secure for as long as it takes to exchange messages.

Even in a future world where large quantum computers are commonplace, it might be reasonable to have great confidence in the temporary security — for, say, a few seconds — of standard classical bit commitments. Essentially, this requires problems which one can be confident, take considerably longer to solve than to state and communicate. Problems which are only polynomially hard for quantum computers, such as factorisation, might well suffice.

If temporarily secure bit commitments are used, the protocols below effectively define a form of bootstrapping, in which bit commitments that are (plausibly) computationally secure for a very long time are built from secure coin tossings, which themselves are built on bit commitments that are computationally secure only for a relatively short time.

In any case, in the rest of this paper it is assumed that some trusted secure remote coin tossing method is available to $A$ and $B$. This could be the relativistic scheme described above, a scheme that is trusted to be computationally secure, or an (as yet undiscovered) unconditionally secure quantum coin tossing scheme that does not rely on relativistic signalling constraints — or any other scheme whose security can be trusted. Whichever, we assume that the security of the scheme extends to multiple coin tosses, in the sense that the participants can trust that implementing the scheme $N$ times is equivalent to sampling $N$ independent and identically distributed random variables, each corresponding to a fair coin.
III. A STRATEGY FOR DERIVING BIT COMMITMENT FROM COIN TOSSING

Abstractly, the basic idea is this. A and B identify some suitable graded class $C = \oplus_{n \geq 0} C_n$ of mathematical objects with the property that there is some increasing function $f(n)$ such that the members of $C_n$ can be identified by $f(n)$ bits. They also identify a class $D = \oplus_{n \geq 0} D_m$ of mathematical objects, with a relation $\rightarrow$ defining a subset of $D \times C$: we say $d \in D$ is associated to $c \in C$ if $d \rightarrow c$. Before implementing the protocol, they will agree on security parameters $m$ and $n$, and on bit string representations for the members of $C_n$ and $D_m$. They then carry out $2f(m)$ secure coin tossings, which they use to generate two randomly chosen elements $c_0$ and $c_1$ of $C_n$.

To commit to a bit $a$, A should then randomly choose a member $d$ of $D_m$ such that $d \rightarrow c_a$, and sends the bit string representation of $d$ to B. To unveil the bit $a$, A sends B a description of $d$ and a proof that $d \rightarrow c_a$.

Clearly, several properties are required for this to define a computationally secure bit commitment protocol.

First, it must be hard for A to identify any elements $d$ such that $d \rightarrow c_0$ and $d \rightarrow c_1$, and such that she has any significant chance of being in a position to prove whichever of these results she chooses at the time of unveiling. This must be true whether or not her choice of $d$ is in fact random. One way of ensuring this would be to ensure that the probability of her, at commitment, being able to choose any $d$ associated with both $c_0$ is very low or zero. Another would be to ensure that, whatever strategy she uses to choose $d$ initially, and whatever strategy she follows during the protocol, her chances — call them $p_0$ and $p_1$ — of generating proofs that $d \rightarrow c_0$ and $d \rightarrow c_1$ during the protocol, obey $p_a \leq P_a$, where the numbers $P_a$ are fixed by her initial strategy in choosing $d$, and where they obey $P_0 + P_1 \leq 1 + \epsilon$, for some suitably small value of the security parameter $\epsilon$.

Second, it must be hard for B, given a randomly chosen $d \rightarrow c_a$, to obtain significant information during the protocol about whether $d$ is likelier to be associated with $c_0$ or $c_1$.

Finally, for the protocol to be practical, it must be easy for A to choose random members of $D_m$ that are associated to a randomly chosen $c_a$, by a method which easily generates a proof of the association. Also, the proof itself must be easy to communicate.

IV. BIT COMMITMENT FROM COIN TOSSING: POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATIONS

A. Subgraph isomorphism

One possible implementation is given by creating random graphs on which $A$ can define instances of the graph subisomorphism problem. Take $C_n$ and $D_m$ to be the sets of graphs with $n$ and $m$ vertices, respectively, with the relation $d \rightarrow c$ if and only if $d$ is a subgraph of $c$.

With these definitions, and having agreed a fixed $n$, $A$ and $B$ generate two random graphs in $C_n$ by carrying out $n(n-1)$ coin tosses, one for each pair of vertices, and including an edge $(i,j)$ if and only if the corresponding coin toss has result 1. $A$ can choose a random subgraph $d \in D_m$ of either graph $c_a \in C_n$ by choosing a random size $m$ subset $I = \{i_1, \ldots, i_m\}$ of the vertices $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ of $c_a$. (I is a random ordered set, i.e. the ordering of the $i_j$ is randomly chosen; in particular, thus, it is generally not numerical.) To send $B$ a description of $d$, she sends the list $\{(k,l) : (i_k,l_l) \in I\}$ an edge of $c_a$. To prove to $B$ that $d \rightarrow c_a$, she simply lists the ordered subset, allowing $B$ to check the above procedure has been followed.

B. Subset sum

Another implementation is given by generating random sets of positive integers on which $A$ can define instances of subset sum problems, defined on sets of density close to 1. Take $C_n$ to be the class of sets of the form $c = \{ c_1, \ldots, c_n \}$, where the $c_i$ are positive binary integers of length $\leq n$. Let $D_m$ be the set of positive integers less than $m2^m$. Define the relation $d \rightarrow c$ to hold if and only if there is a set of integers $x_i \in \{0,1\}$ such that $d = \sum_i x_i c_i$.

With these definitions, having agreed a fixed $n$, $A$ and $B$ can use $2n^2$ coin tosses to generate two independent random size $n$ sets, $c_0 = \{a_0^i\}$ and $c_1 = \{a_1^i\}$, using each coin toss to define a specified bit of a specified set element. $A$ can then choose a random set of bits $x_i \in \{0,1\}$, and commit the bit $a$ to $B$ by sending the sum $d = \sum_i e_i x_i$. To prove to $B$ that $d \rightarrow c_a$, she simply sends an ordered list of the $x_i$.

C. Remark

Other possible implementations could be based on matrix representability or other problems that are defined by probability distributions generated by finite strings of coin tosses and are known to be average case intractable. [15,16]

V. SECURITY DISCUSSION

Are these protocols computationally secure against quantum computers? Are they computationally secure even against classical computers? These are hard questions. Proving affirmative answers would mean proving that \((BQ)P \neq NP\). And even assuming that $P \neq NP$ and $BQP \neq NP$, conjectures which are widely believed,
would not imply classical or quantum computational security. I give here only a short illustrative list of security worries, followed by some reasons for thinking that the protocols might, nonetheless, be hard for quantum computers to break.

A. Security worries

Consider first security against classical computers. Recall that both the subgraph isomorphism and subset sum problems are NP-complete. (See for example Ref. [17].) Let us assume that, as is widely believed, P ≠ NP. If so, and if B’s task were to decide whether a graph \( g \) was isomorphic to a subgraph of a graph \( c \), or whether an integer \( d \) could be written as a binary sum \( \sum_i x_i c_i \) of knapsack elements, then it would be impossible to find an algorithm that solved all such problems in a time polynomial in the problem parameters.

B’s task is slightly different, though: he has to decide whether a graph \( g \) is isomorphic to a subgraph of graphs \( c_0 \) or \( c_1 \), or whether an integer \( d \) is a subset sum from the set \( c_0 \) or \( c_1 \), knowing that one or the other is the case. It seems unlikely that this decision problem is substantially easier than the subgraph isomorphism or subset sum problems in worst case, since it is hard to see how to address the first except by trying to solve the second for each of \( c_0 \) and \( c_1 \). But I know no theorem showing that even these slightly modified problems are still NP-complete.

An NP-completeness result would anyway not suffice. B needs to solve, or not solve, instances. So the case for security against B relies on the belief that subset sum, subgraph isomorphism, or whatever randomly generated problem is chosen, is average case hard.

Provably average case complete problems, which could be used in the protocols above, are known [15,16]. It is also believed that subset sum is average case hard, for appropriate parameter choices [18]. However — another potential concern — these average case results and conjectures apply to problem instances chosen from different probability distributions from ours. Normally, when the average case of a decision problem — in our notation: is \( d \rightarrow c? \) — is considered, one assumes that \( c \) and \( d \) are independently randomly generated, with suitable probability distributions. Here, we have three structures, \( c_0, c_1 \) and \( d \), and while \( c_0 \) and \( c_1 \) are independently randomly generated in a standard way, \( d \) is not. To ensure that \( d \rightarrow c_0 \) or \( d \rightarrow c_1 \), and that \( A \) knows which, we required that \( A \) use some random algorithm which takes the description of \( c_0 \) — for her choice of \( a \) — and constructs a \( d \) such that \( d \rightarrow c_0 \). We need it to be hard for \( B \) to solve the decision problem, for a random instance, even if he knows the random algorithm which \( A \) uses to define \( d \). (If security were to rely on \( A \) keeping the algorithm secret, and not just its random input, we would not have a completely defined protocol. Any published rules which told \( A \) exactly how to implement the protocol would allow \( B \) to break it.)

Obviously, the concerns listed above are still more of a worry when considering quantum attacks, since quantum computers are for some purposes more powerful than classical computers, and since quantum complexity is less well understood than classical complexity.

B. Why might one nonetheless hope the protocols are secure?

The case for security, such as it is, begins from the widely shared belief that there is no quantum algorithm capable of solving the general case of an NP-complete problem in polynomial time. A commonly cited (e.g. Ref. [19]) reason for this belief is that NP-complete problems, such as subgraph isomorphism or subset sum, are effectively as hard as searching for a particular entry in a database whose size grows exponentially in the length of the problem description. The reasoning here is that, if one wants to decide, for instance, whether a size \( m \) graph \( H \) is a subgraph of a size \( n \) graph \( G \), there may be no algorithm substantially better than searching through all the \( \binom{n}{m} \) subgraphs of \( G \) and seeing whether \( H \) matches any of them — the argument being that algorithms which are substantially more efficient than brute force need some mathematical structure to work with, and this type of problem just has too little structure to allow such algorithms.

This intuition could, of course, be wrong. If it were right, though, it would mean that efficient quantum algorithms for NP-complete problems could, indeed, be excluded, since we know that the quantum algorithms can give only a square-root speed-up for database search. [20]

Suppose the intuition is right. It is tempting to take it somewhat further. One might speculate that B’s problem — searching for a randomly chosen subgraph of one of two random graphs — is also not substantially easier than a database search, when \( m \) and \( n \) are suitably related and \( n \) is large. Similarly, one might speculate that the problem facing a dishonest A — finding a common subgraph of two random graphs — is not substantially easier than finding collisions of a random two-to-one function, a generalised search problem which is also suspected (though not proven) to be hard for quantum computers. If so — if, in the end, the lack of mathematical structure in each of these problems allows them to resist quantum attack — then the protocols would indeed be secure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The ideas above suggest a possible way forward in developing "quantum-immune" protocols for general mistrustful cryptographic tasks. More immediately, they add to the motivation for extending the folk wisdom about — or rigorous bounds on — the power of quantum computing. Can we find good reasons for extending the intuition that quantum computers cannot break general case NP-complete problems to average case instances? Can we extend those intuitions further to collision-type problems such as identifying a common subgraph of random graphs? Or, conversely, and against expectation, could there be reasons to believe that quantum attacks may indeed be effective in these last two cases?

VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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